(Tùy Bút phiếm luận, thời sự, xã hội)

Tình Hình Căng Thẳng:
TT Nhật ABE gần đây xin Hội Đồng An Ninh Nhật ủng hộ Chiến Lược Quốc Phòng mạnh của ông để Phòng Thủ sự Tấn Công của TQCS trong biến cố dành Chủ Quyển Lãnh Hải Biển Hoa Đông và cũng gần đây, TT Quốc Phòng, ông Chuck Hazel, Hoa Kỳ đã sang Nhật và những chỉ dấu cho thấy là Hoa Kỷ buộc phải bênh vực Đồng Minh của mình. Nhiều Nguồn Tin khác qua Internets và các Thông Tinh Truyền Hình, các Bài Dự Đoán, Bình Luận tham khảo của chúng tôi càng thêm lo lắng. Quý Bạn xem qua những Youtubes sau đây và đọc vài Trích Đoạn Phân Tích đáng xác tín, thì cả TQCS và Nhật đang thực sự Chuẩn Bị cho Cuộc Chiến Tranh này. Câu Hỏi đc đặt ra là Mỹ có sẽ tham dự cùng lúc với Nhật Bản không? Và như những Chiêu Thức Chuyển Hành như Tập Quân Sự Chung trong một vài miền của Thái Bình Dương, Mỹ chuyển số Chiến Hạm nổi danh trong TCII sang vùng Châu Á, vv.. Chúng tôi nghĩ rằng Tình Hình Chiến Tranh rất căng thẳng rồi?

Các Dấu Hiệu Chuẩn Bị Chiến Tranh:
Ngoài Youtubes trong đây, nguồn sau đây chứng dẫn vài đoạn của tác giả bài viết trong chủ đề này, ông Peter Sysmonds gần như dự đoán tích cực là sẽ có Chiến Tranh. Xin xem Trích Đoạn sau:
[The so-called “2 plus 2” meeting in Tokyo this week of US Secretary of State John Kerry and Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel with their Japanese counterparts marked a significant escalation of the US military build-up against China. The lengthy joint statement announced major deployments of hi-tech US weaponry to Japan and a green light for Japanese remilitarisation, within the framework of “a more robust alliance”.Thursday’s talks took place in the wake of the Obama administration’s decision to postpone an imminent military attack on Syria last month in the face of mass popular opposition, both in the United States and around the world. The “2 plus 2” meetings make clear that despite the postponement of war with Syria, Washington’s plans for military escalation are proceeding apace.

Washington’s decision to back down provoked consternation among US allies not only in the Middle East, but in Asia, where Obama’s “pivot” has encouraged Japan and other countries to adopt a more aggressive stance towards China.

Fears that American allies could be left out on a limb were underscored this week when Obama cancelled his high-profile trip to South East Asia amid the crisis in Washington generated by the government shutdown. While the Obama administration has repeatedly declared the “rebalancing” of US military forces to the Indo-Pacific region would be quarantined from austerity measures, such pledges are called into question by the political turmoil over the budget.

The “2 plus 2” meeting on Thursday sent the unmistakable message that the US is proceeding with its military build-up in Asia that includes stationing 60 percent of American naval and air force assets in the region by 2020. The American deployments announced in the joint statement are all directed at strengthening US-Japanese military against China. These include:

* The stationing of a second X-band early warning radar in Japan near Kyoto, as part of joint anti-ballistic missile systems. While nominally directed against North Korea’s primitive nuclear capabilities, these weapons are part of the Pentagon’s preparations for nuclear war against China and Russia.

* The basing of advanced P-8 surveillance and anti-submarine planes starting in December 2013 and long-range Global Hawk drones next year. The stepping up of US maritime surveillance in the East China and South China Seas, where the US “pivot” has exacerbated tense maritime disputes with China, including with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu island, is particularly provocative.

* Two squadrons of MV-22 Osprey vertical take-off transport planes will enhance the capacity of the Japanese military to rapidly deploy troops in the event of a conflict over the Senkakus. The Pentagon also plans to deploy F-35B vertical take-off stealth fighters by 2017—again for the first time outside the US—boosting its ability to carry out its Air-Sea Battle strategy for a blitzkrieg against military targets inside China.

The Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia”, which began in mid-2009 and was openly announced in November 2011, has inflamed nationalism and militarism throughout the region. Nowhere is this more evident than in Japan, where the right-wing government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which took office last December, has boosted military spending, toughened its stance on the Senkakus, and taken steps to free the military from the constraints imposed by the Japanese constitution, which formally forbids external military aggression.

In the joint “2 by 2” statement, the US “welcomed” Japan’s “intention to make more proactive contributions to addressing the challenges faced by the international community”; its decision to establish a National Security Council; its expanded military budget; its re-examination of the legal basis for “collective self-defence; and “regional contributions, including capacity building effects vis-à-vis South East Asian countries.”

Abe is proceeding with his election pledge to build “a strong Japan” with “a strong military”. His government is seeking to either circumvent or amend the constitution to allow for “collective self-defence”—that is, the ability of Japanese imperialism to wage war with the US including “pre-emptive” military strikes. Japan has already pledged to boost the coast guard in the Philippines—the former US colony and leading South East Asian partner in confronting China.] – (Xin coi chi tiết trong website source).

Ước Tính Tinh Hình Trong Gang Tấc:
Trong khi nguồn tin từ Opinion, BTV Bernie Lopez, còn đề cập đến mối Liên Kết của Hoa Kỳ và Phi Luật Tân trong việc TQCS tiến chiếm Vùng Chủ Quyền Lưỡi Bò trong Biển Đông mới đây, cùng với sự Tập Trận của nhiều Chiến Hạm cả của Hoa Kỳ-Taiwan, Hoa-Kỳ-Phillipines, và nhất là Quyền Thông Thương Quốc Tế ở Vùng Biển này. Xin mời xem Trích Đoạn sau:

[It’s important for Filipinos to be aware of the probability of war between the United States and China because the Spratlys may be the flashpoint in such a development. The probability is based on the emerging threat of China’s “antiaccess/antidenial capabilities (A2/AD),” or new weapons that will make it difficult for US carriers to ply China-Taiwan waters.

In 1996, China conducted missile tests and military exercises in the Strait of Taiwan. The United States responded by sending two aircraft carriers to the South China Sea. To America the issue was, hardly Taiwan’s independence, but US military superiority and pride. The US show of force was to remind China of America’s vast superiority. The move was a “deterrence” to China’s aggressive posture.

Alas, the move backfired. Instead of deterring, it triggered an arms race. Realizing its weakness in its own backyard, China had to move in the name of survival. It embarked on an aggressive weapons program to bridge the gap.
Even earlier, China was investing in sophisticated but low-cost weapons, such as “antiship missiles, short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, stealth submarines, and cyber and space arms.” The Pentagon called these “asymmetric weapons,” meaning cheap bullets threatening expensive tanks. It saw threats against fixed US bases in Japan and Guam, and mobile carriers. Six decades earlier, the United States had “unrivaled naval and air power.” Now, all of a sudden, it can be denied access to Taiwan waters by antiship missiles.

The Pentagon’s goal was to respond to the “Chinese threat.” In truth it was a “US threat” on China’s turf. The Pentagon had a misguided mindset that America had a right to intrude into any territory on the planet—in layman’s terms, hegemony. There were two hurdles to a greater response. The first was the absence of a consensus from the civilian government, which pooh-poohed the Pentagon’s urgent cry of “Wolf! Wolf!” The second was the prospect that the cost of such an expensive war would dwarf that of US military interventions combined, and serve as the coup de grace for a US economic collapse. The Pentagon saw that China’s A2/AD would “raise the human and economic cost of [US presence] in the region to prohibitive levels.”

Two strategists, Andrew Marshall and Andrew Krepinevich, have been raising the alarm about China’s new capabilities since the early 1990s. A sophisticated US Air Force simulation war game in October 2008 called “Pacific Vision” triggered the conceptualization of the Air/Sea Battle (ASB) that could “execute networked, integrated attacks-in-depth to disrupt, destroy, and defeat the enemy (A2/AD).” The ASB strategy is a “blinding attack” on “Chinese antiaccess facilities, including land- and sea-based missile launchers, surveillance and communication platforms, satellite and antisatellite weapons, and command and control nodes.”] (Xin mời xem chi tiết trong Ref Source).

Tạm Kết Luận: Hậu Quả Sẽ Ra Sao?
Chỉ có The, tác giả chuyên nghiên cứu về dạng Xung Đột Xã Hội, Trefor Moss, trái lại tiên đoán khó có thể Xẩy Ra Chiến Tranh Trung-Nhật vì 7 Lý Do trong một Trích Đoạn sau:
[Even as tensions between Beijing and Tokyo grow by the day, there are good reasons to believe outright conflict can be avoided. The sequel seldom improves on the original. Yet Shinzo Abe, Japan’s newly re-elected prime minister, has already displayed more conviction during his second spell at the Kantei than in the entire year of his first, unhappy premiership.
Political energy is a plus only when it’s wisely deployed however, and some fear that Abe is picking a fight he can’t win when it comes to his hardline stance on China. Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone, especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Each time fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likely flashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that China and Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that, “China and Japan are sliding towards war,” while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers: “Don’t be too surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].” News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns.
These doomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosed Japan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereignty issues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing “daily exercises in coercion” and advocated a “democratic security diamond” comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan’s first in a decade – and strengthened security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japan in order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather than creating the conditions for one. And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as an ever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowball unpredictably into a wider conflict.
But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan:] (Xin coi chi tiết trong Ref Source).
Như vậy, theo Trefor Moss dự đoán, Thế Cờ CT Trung Nhật tuy căng thẳng, song chỉ là những Chiêu Thức đi quân có tính chất phô trương và chuẩn bị ở tương lai cho Thế Đứng trong Địa Cầu của mình. Lý do chính, Chuẩn Siêu Cường TQCS muốn trở thành một Siêu Cường như Hoa Kỳ? Song với sự dự đoán cá nhân của chúng tôi, chg tôi đồng ý với BTV Trefor Moss, là khó có thể Chiến Tranh Toàn Diện trong CĐ Nhân Loại được, và có thể ờ Dạng Cục Bộ rồi giải hòa, nghị hội và Tìm Ra Giải Pháp Hòa Bình mới cho các Đối Tác mà thôi.
Tuy nhiên, Đời Sống là một Khu Rừng Rậm (Life is A Jungle) như nhiều Nhà Xã Hội Học viết, Sự Tranh Đấu để Sinh Tồn quả thực là gây cấn và khó lường. Chúng Ta hãy nên chờ đợi mà thôi?
Tran, Vanson – 11/2013
(Xin xem chi tiết, từng mục, trong Youtubesnày)



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